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Abstract 
 The systematic global market risk of the type found in the gigantic 
Norwegian Oil Fund, called “Government Pension Fund – Global (GPF – 
G)”, is discussed at length in this study. The objective is to find out if the risk 
capital animate ethical venture initiative. In the financial and entrepreneurial 
literature it has over time become common to relate systematic vulnerability 
and risk to a long range of factors that might cause imbalance and failure.  
Ulrich Beck (1992) postulates that risks today related to innovations and 
unethical and uncontrolled venture capital have a different significance for 
everyday life from the risks that applied to previous historical eras. He 
claims that human activity, innovation and technology in advanced political 
and economic modernity produce as a side-effect risks venturing investment. 
That demands specialised expertise to access and recognize, and are 
collective, global, and irreversible in their impact.  
To abstain from venturing actions are a way out of the dilemma for the 
investors. The Norwegian petroleum activity under regulatory management 
and control is an example of that. The Fund’s revenues have been shrinking 
lately following the oil prices of the market diving down globally.  
Perhaps the Norwegian Oil Fund is to be restructured in a framework of 
ethics to become less risk exposed in a global financial market perspective, 
and become more innovative and ethical directed. 
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Some facts on Norwegian oil and gas resources1. 
 The Government Pension Fund - Global is saving for future 
generations in Norway. One day the oil and gas will run out, but the return 
on the fund will continue to benefit the Norwegian population. The Fund’s 
market value 2017 is about 7 3340 billion NOK. 
                                                          
1 Official data from Norwegian Central Bank Investment management 2017. 
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 The Fund generated an annual return of 5.6 percent from the 
establishment of Norwegian Central Bank Investment Management in 1998 
to the end of 2015, measured in the fund's currency basket. After 
management costs and inflation, the return was 3.7 percent. The return in 
dollars was 5.8 percent. 4 % of the Fund value can be used in the national 
budget. 179.6 billion NOK were transferred to the national budget in 
2015.The fund is integrated into the government budget. A fundamental 
principle of Norwegian fiscal policy is the so-called budgetary rule. It states 
that over the course of a business cycle, the government may only spend the 
expected real return on the fund, estimated at 4 percent per year. This helps 
to gradually phase oil revenue into the economy. Spending just the return of 
the fund rather than eating into its capital means that the fund will also 
benefit future generations and their welfare. The Fund is investing money in 
78 different countries, in 9 050 companies, and 1.3% of them are European 
companies. This means not domestic venture capital and entrepreneurship 
but only risk capital invested abroad (Shane and Venkataraman 2000). 
 
Norwegian oil capital is risk capital not venture capital targeting 
entrepreneurship. 
 The Government Report No. 24 (2006-2007) to the Parliament 
(Stortinget), ‘On the Management of the Government Pension Fund’, 
presented a very optimistic view on the risks involved but not on venturing 
actions. Taking as a point of departure that the risk-return profile of the 
Pension Fund is largely determined by the governmental investment 
guidelines, the report continues this way: ‘The risk assumed in active 
management has only to a limited degree increased the actual market risk of 
the Fund…’ (Government Report No. 24 (2006-2007): 82). This statement is 
often repeated also in 2017. 
 There is, however, no simple way of conceiving risk-regulation 
regimes. No one has ever seen a risk-regulation regime embracing a totality 
of effects – and side-effects – along all dimensions. Against this background, 
Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein, and Robert Baldwin have stated (2001: 
179) that, “principles that have been advanced for regulatory assessment 
typically comprise some mix of “economic rationalist” cost-effectiveness 
criteria together with rule-of-law criteria – such as proportionality and 
transparency – and policy evaluation to identify regulatory impacts and 
alternatives’  
 We can recognise the meaning of this quotation in the Norwegian 
Petroleum industry and the establishment of the Pension Fund - Global. With 
regard to the optimistic view on risk occurrence and the Pension Fund -
Global cited from the Government, as we have seen, there are good reasons 
to doubt this low assessment of the market risk of the Pension Fund. We 
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should ignore neither the regular cycle of global economic crises nor the 
connection between global warming and CO2-emissions from petroleum 
activities, which is kept outside risk assessments.  
 The notion of ‘actual market risks’ with regard to the future of the 
Pension Fund is far too narrow for a sufficient evaluation in the service of 
the common good. In a political and ethical perspective, the Norwegian 
Pension Fund – Global should not, by definition, represent risk capital in the 
terms of neo-classical liberal economic thinking but venture capital 
stimulating innovation and entrepreneurship (Busenitz, L., et al. 2003). 
Contextually, substantial regulations by law and ethics deviate from 
regulations only by the market. 
  
The dilemma; foreign investments versus domestic investments 
  “What does Norway get out of its Oil Fund (Government Pension 
Fund – Global (GPF-G)), if not more Strategic Infrastructure Investment, is 
Michael Hudson asking” (Hudson 2011). He keeps on asking: “What do 
Norwegians get out of these financial savings, besides a modest interest and 
dividend yield? Innovation and entrepreneurship? The export surplus is said 
to be too large to spend more than a small fraction (a Procrustean 4 percent) 
at home without causing inflation”? So other countries get not only 
Norway’s petroleum, but also most of the royalties and earnings from its 
production. Meanwhile, Norway spends little on itself, more accurately on 
infrastructure and entrepreneurship. Even now its financial managers are 
beginning to worry about how risky the stock markets are becoming and feel 
the need to diversify investments into real estate. The Norwegian 
government still avoid investing the Pension Fund’s wealth to build up the 
domestic infrastructure. This might happened in the near future, has the 
Norwegian Government promised. Michael Hudsons critical analysis goes 
further like this. 
 What seems ironic is that while Norway is invested its oil capital 
savings mainly in European and U.S. financial markets, money managers in 
these countries are reinvested these money overseas to the BRICS economies 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). This system contains 
investment risks not venture. These geographical widespread investments 
reduce risk to Norway and return earnings directly to make the economy 
more competitive and benefits the survival of the welfare state. The Pension 
Fund goes beyond the purely financial scope of decision, simply what 
foreign stocks and bonds to buy. The basic financial scope of question is 
which securities will achieve the highest rate of return or rise most quickly in 
price. This is a short-term decision. Little of this financial acrobatic policy 
adds value to the real capital of the Norwegian economy nor as venturing 
capital or welfare. 
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 Given this situation, how should Norway best policy look like? 
(Veggeland 2011). As a point of departure, the Norwegian government has a 
broader option than merely to steer savings into foreign financial markets. 
The policy should improve the economy by creating tangible means of 
production to raise productivity by working in tandem with leading national 
industries, generate innovation and entrepreneurship by give investment in 
research priorities, and favor building infrastructure, social as well as 
physical infrastructure. And rather than being inflationary, public investment 
enabled economies to minimize their cost of living and doing business.  
 There are two approaches to how the Norwegian government may 
manage their Pension Fund – Global. For simplicity, these can be called the 
passive and active approaches. The present approach is passive. Norway 
consigns its petroleum “earnings to money managers to buy stock or bond 
ownership abroad without linking these purchases to its own future 
development – except by receiving a modest foreign exchange return” 
(Hudson 2011:3). The more active approach considers the government’s duty 
as being to develop the domestic economy to the benefit of its citizens. This 
is best done by initiating infrastructure building, including education and 
public health care, research and development, support entrepreneurship and 
investment in transportation, power generation and distribution, 
communications and information technology.  
 Public infrastructure represents the largest capital expenditure in 
almost every country, yet little trace of its economic role appears in today’s 
Norwegian income and product accounts. Free market ideology wrongly 
treats public spending as deadweight, and counts infrastructure spending as 
part of the deficit, not as productive capital investment. Nobel Prize winner 
1989, Trygve Haavelmo from Norway, describes the aim of public 
investment as being different from that of individuals or business. The 
ultimate aim was not to seek profits, but to create the best economic and 
social system possible with the resources at hand. 
 As the Norwegian Prime Minister (PM) since 2005, Jens Stoltenberg, 
an economist and former Minister of Finance, actually he was the main 
architect behind the Norwegian Pension Fund - Global (of US $ 584 bill) and 
"the budget rule" of not spending more than "an estimated return" of 4 % pro 
annum. His main argument is that the fund's passive strategy of today is 
spreading the risk into a multitude of minority positions, and that therefore 
Hudson’s advice of an active strategy and to concentrate investments in 
national strategic infrastructure and technology will increase the risk rather 
than reduce the risk. Probably Hudson will respond by arguing that 
apparently the PM has not understood the industrial motivation of real 
economic investment (real wealth creation) for Hudson's suggestion as 
opposed to the financial motivation (monetary profit) that he himself 
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pursues. Monetary profit motivates the Pension Fund’s investment in stock 
and bonds global, while domestic wealth creation is passed over by the PM.  
 The Norwegian government downgrades the monetary profit motive. 
Instead the Government argues that the potential threat of increased domestic 
investments will make the Norwegian currency harder against foreign 
currencies combined with a growing interest rate. The result of this will be 
loss of economic competiveness internationally because of the currency 
impact. 
 
The dilemma; negative ethical exclusion versus innovative positive 
selection 
 Thus far, the Ethical Council, which monitors the Government 
Pension Fund – Global (GPF-G) investments has sought to meet its ethical 
objectives through so-called negative selection, i.e. exclusion of companies 
for unethical behavior picked out from the large universe of investments. As 
we know these may be companies that violate human rights, use child labor, 
fail to observe ordinary standards for employee rights, manufacture nuclear 
weapons or cluster munitions, are responsible for severe environmental 
damage, etc.  
 Ethical management of the GPF-G could be exercised in two 
different manners; by negative exclusion or positive selection. For some 
years now, in the public debate, it has been proposed that the ethical 
management should be reoriented from negative screening to innovative 
positive selection. Instead of excluding companies that violate the decided 
ethical standards, one should invest only in companies and branches that 
appear to be, in some sense, an active force for the good on ethical issues. 
Thus, Th. Johnsen and O. Gjølberg (2009:2) write:  
“.. positive selection involves a significant narrowing of the 
investment universe. It is, generally speaking, much more difficult to 
declare a company to be completely without blame than completely 
beyond the realm of the ethically acceptable. The potential fallout 
from error under a pure positive selection strategy may also be much 
higher than under a negative selection strategy”.  
 Of course, they are right, and consequently Norway has chosen the 
easiest way; negative exclusion (Veggeland 2009). Following up their 
conclusion, Johnsen and Gjølberg suggest a number of more pragmatic 
approaches that could be realized by decisions in the Ethical Council. One 
such approach they suggest for Norway is the “popular principle” of 
selecting positively the best-in-class strategy. This principle, they postulate, 
entails selecting those companies that are perceived, based on various ethical 
criteria, to be best in their class of type-production. The class may be defined 
as an industry (energy, consumer goods, finance, etc.), but it is also possible 
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to define classes as type-production dominant for a particular region. This 
indicates that a firm may be the best in an ethical poor class, and should be 
rewarded with investments, and another relatively good ethical firm may be 
far from the top of the elite ethical and sustainable class of type-production, 
and investment should be withdrawn. This ranking principle as a pragmatic 
approach to the political will of realize positive selection more strongly has 
never been accepted in Norway as a policy for the GPF-G and ethical 
investments. The reason for that seems to be the problem of ranking. In the 
jungle of firms and branches it is almost technically impossible to figure out 
indicators, criteria and measures to make the ranking relevant. 
 What actually is a more relevant policy approach for Norway in this 
context is that criteria have been introduced in recent years, which are 
directed investments for stimulating the growth of upcoming 
entrepreneurship, of pioneering firms and branches, which concentrate on 
sustainable production for the future. Thus, in line with international trends, 
the criteria, the Fund favors in particular investment in companies within 
environmental technology, solar energy, and renewable energy in general, 
etc. The literature often refers to these criteria as ’pioneer screening‘. Such 
selection strategies are premised on the idea that companies that make a 
positive contribution to the climate – or to the fight against AIDS and 
malaria - generate positive ethical externalities. Of course, this pioneering 
screening policy is not an unproblematic one. Obviously, new ethical 
conflicts or dilemmas may arise. When eventually the pioneering type-
production becomes a commercial success in the global market normally and 
most likely negative externalities of ethical relevance arise. A randomly 
chosen example is given by Johnsen and Gjoelberg: Pioneering screening 
can trigger investments in a pharmaceutical company that devotes a large 
share of R&D resources on developing a low price anti-malaria drug that is 
affordable for poor people in Africa. NPF-G supports such investments. 
However, this company may at the same time be conducting large-scale 
animal testing or producing unhealthy drugs. 
            In the Norwegian debate on the GPF-G it has also been proposed that 
the management of the Fund should focus on investments for helping 
forward entrepreneurship, economic growth and poverty alleviation in 
developing countries. This perspective contains interesting views and raise 
entirely new ethical issues and challenges, in particular as far as positive 
selection is concerned. It is regrettable, but corruption and poverty do tend to 
co-exist, making it difficult to combine positive selection based on a 
company’s ethical track-record and investments in developing countries. As 
observed and for the corruption problem, the NPF-G’s positive selection is 
therefore often biased in favor of well-established, large companies in the 
rich countries. 
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